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A Politics of Rhetoric
 
Rhetoric returns today in force, if not with a vengeance in contemporary theori-
zation of politics. This is because some of the most perspicacious political think-
ers, not only explain politics by means of rhetoric, but go so far as to say that 
“metaphor, metonymy, synechdoche (and especially catachresis as their com-
mon denominator) are […] ontological categories describing the constitution of 
objectivity as such.”1 Indeed, following Laclau here, one could say that politics is 
possible only if it is situated in the terrain where tropological movement supple-
ments the hole in the symbolic Other, thereby constituting a groundless ground 
for the structuration of social life. In raising the value of the catachresis to the 
level of operational concept with his theory of the hegemonic suture, Laclau, 
thereby indicated the degree to which it would be impossible to grasp anything 
of the contingent production of the social link in the space of discursivity that is 
structurally incomplete, without a necessary recourse to the unsolvable tension 
between metaphor and metonymy. Politics, in this view, has to be rethought on 
the basis of the opposition between the contingent character of the instituting 
moment of society and its enabling conditions of (im)possibility.
While this pivoting of perspectives casts a different light upon politics, it also 
throws into relief what is at stake in the ancient quarrel between politics and 
rhetoric. Indeed, setting out from the premise that, as such, the symbolic order, 
the social order included, has no other basis than the sheer contingency of the 
laws of language, ultimately, the laws of metaphor and metonymy, rhetoric is 
supposed to provide a vantage point from which the fundamental groundless-
ness of the dominant discourse which shapes our reality can be appreciated, 
that is to say, thrown into question. 
1 E. Laclau, “An Ethics of Militant Engagement” in P. Hallward (ed.) Think Again. Alain Badiou 
and the future of Philosophy, Continuum, New York, London 2004, p. 137.
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In a certain sense, the relationship between politics and rhetoric, which is thus 
both antinomian and complicit, could be read rhetorically, that is, as revolv-
ing around the polarity of metaphor and metonymy. Contemporary rhetoricians 
namely attempt to show how the unlimited play of displacements and substitu-
tions, which can neither be controlled nor stopped, makes a direct challenge to 
the politics which stands for the moment of closure, the moment of arrest of this 
unending movement. The implication here is that the politically subversive and 
therefore emancipatory potential of rhetoric consists first and foremost in its 
capacity to reveal what politics tries desperately to conceal: the impossibility of 
establishing the socio-political order otherwise than through a hegemonic act of 
closure, an act which is, in and of itself, groundless. This means that the oppo-
sition between politics and rhetoric according to which politics is supposed to 
prioritize the closure of the constitutively incomplete social field, while rhetoric 
would privilege the metonymic endless displacements, can only be sustained 
if rhetoric is identified with an operation of de-totalization, an operation chal-
lenging the contingency of the closure of the structurally non-totalizable social 
field. To put the matter in other terms still: by resisting the movement of closure, 
metonymy brings on a disjunction between being and appearance, that is, the 
inevitability of slippage, non-correspondence between the being taken in its 
genericity, as it were, that is to say, devoid of all identity or predicate, and the 
master’s discourse which can only operate through a logic of predication. 
However, the polarity between politics and rhetoric is tenable solely if politics is 
reduced to the institutional moment of the social or, to borrow Lacan’s term, to 
the master’s discourse. Having the performative power of the signifier to struc-
ture the social field by assigning to the members of a given society a place and 
a function, a ‘mandate’, as Lacan calls it, the master’s discourse thereby de-
termines what counts and what is of no account, what is visible and what is 
not, ultimately, what exists and what does not. Bearing in mind this ontological 
dimension inherent in the discourse of the master, the crucial question for every 
oppositional politics worthy of the name is of course: how can that come into 
being which, within the framework of the master’s discourse, remains invisible, 
that which, basically, does not exist? 
It is from such a perspective that political implications of Lacan’s conception of 
the symptom can be appreciated. From the start, Lacan namely conceived of the 
symptom as that which disrupts the smooth working of the social order, betray-
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ing the subject’s resistance to total alienation in that order. The point here is that 
the symptom can generate its subversive effects precisely to the extent that it op-
erates like a metaphor,2 that is to say, as a quilting point which, by reconfiguring 
relations between elements of a given situation in a different way, momentarily 
reveals the possibility of an entirely unprecedented type of the socio-discursive 
arrangement.
It should be noted that, in contrast to the famous battle between deconstruction-
ists and Lacanians which has pitched metonymy against metaphor, the present 
debate over the meaning and value of rhetoric for contemporary theorizing of 
politics is, on the contrary, shaped by the primacy of metonymy over metaphor. 
Certainly, it is not by accident that contemporary rhetoricians set out from the 
assumption that metonymy precedes and dominates metaphor. It is not by ac-
cident precisely to the extent that rhetoric itself is seen to be putting forward 
the affinity between metonymy and contingency. In prioritizing metonymy over 
metaphor, contemporary rhetoric could, thus, be regarded as promoting a logic 
of the contingent in the field of politics. Against the necessity of the social order 
put up by the dominant discourse, rhetoric postulates as its axiom the necessity 
of contingency. 
It is in this connection that the primacy of metonymy takes on great interest. In a 
discursive universe where metaphor is the structuring principle, the metonymic 
slippage, indeed, provides the only way for the inscription of the inexistent – a 
term used by A. Badiou, to designate an invisible excess, a remaindered part of 
a social space which is integral to it but which is unaccountable within the he-
gemonic articulation of that space. Proceeding from the irreducible incommen-
surability between the metaphorical closure and the ceaseless metonymic slip-
page, contemporary rhetoricians set out to track down a point that escapes the 
imposed discursive arrangement, a vanishing, yet always specific, determinate 
point of the inexistent that singularizes the given regime of mastery. While it is 
true that the mere apparition of the inexistent brings into relief the contingency 
of the transcendental regime of discursivity which constitutes our social reality, 
it is also true that the decisive issue is exactly how to inscribe the constitutive 
lack of a signifier in this discursive arrangement for those who have paid the 
2 Indeed, for Lacan, “the symptom is a metaphor”. J. Lacan, “The Instance of the Letter”, Écrits, 
trans. by Bruce Fink, W.W. Norton & Company, New York and London 2006, p. 439. 
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price for the institution of the social order through their exclusion. The ques-
tion of the inscription of the inexistent is crucial because, in a discursive space 
organized by the master discourse, the inexistent cannot be presented or, better, 
represented as such. The inexistent, strictly speaking, can only ex-sist, it cannot 
exist, for to exist it would have to be articulated in terms of the existing structure 
of placement. What is at stake in the emergence, within the structure of places 
provided by the discourse of the master, of that which remains outside its grasp 
is therefore the question of how to assert the impossibility of the inscription of 
the inexistent as the sole mode for its inscription. 
In this respect, the primacy of metonymy has to be viewed in the context of 
the multifarious attempts the contemporary theorization of politics makes to 
come to grips with the constitutive incompletion of the social, ultimately, with 
the fundamental groundlessness of the acts of political constitution. In such a 
context, it is all the more important to take into account the fact that there are 
two possible ways of coming to terms with the non-closure of the political space 
of discursivity: the operation of supplementation and the operation of comple-
mentation. Situated on the basis of a negation of all grounding in the real, the 
metaphorical suture and the metonymic displacement represent two different 
ways of making up for this hole in the symbolic Other, two strategies for dealing 
with the radical absence of a formula which would inscribe the institution of 
the social in the real. It could then be said that metaphor succeeds in closing the 
discursive space of a given situation by producing a suppletory device under the 
guise of a catachrestic signifier, a semblance, in the very place where the Other 
is lacking. Giving body to the ineliminable lack of grounding, the catachrestic 
signifier is ultimately nothing but the metonymy of the hole in the Other. Sup-
plementing the lack in the social Other with a catachrestic signifier, the opera-
tion of metaphor effects the suturation of the social, but at the price of conceal-
ing the fundamental groundlessness of such an operation. Due to the structural 
impossibility of the social order thus imposed to subsume the totality of a given 
social situation, the metaphorical totalization itself is hollowed out. Metaphor, 
in sum, fails to provide a true solution to the hole in the Other. In fact, inasmuch 
as the institution of the social order is groundless, every instance destined to 
supplement the lack in the Other appears to be nothing more than a semblance, 
a symbolic stand-in for the lacking real grounding. 
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In contrast to metaphor, where the barrier resisting suturation is crossed, meton-
ymy avoids such a totalizing movement. Oscillating between a radical absence 
of all order and the institution of an order through the master’s catachresis, me-
tonymy indicates a place for a possible, yet unattainable structural closure, as 
it can only be situated in infinity. A place for the totalization of the social space 
is thus preserved, reserved, as it were, without ever being realized. Put differ-
ently, as the infinite movement generated by the lack in the Other, metonymy, 
paradoxically, gives rise to a belief in the possibility of a final closure. It could 
then be argued that whereas metonymy places the bar on politics, more exactly, 
on every single attempt to politically constitute the social, only to preserve the 
socio-symbolic Other from being barred, metaphor, on the contrary, by raising 
the powerlessness of metonymy to the status of structural impossibility, implies 
that the social Other, as such, is originally lacking, incomplete. Far from send-
ing the question of the final closure back to the Other, and thereby making this 
Other consist, metaphor sends politics back to the incommensurable difference 
between the order of the signifier and the order of the real. It is on this basis that 
it is possible to conclude that, in contrast to metaphor which validates the ir-
reducible hiatus, or chasm, separating the social order from its real grounding, 
and thus pointing to the Other which does not exist, metonymy, should rather 
be viewed as running away exactly from what metaphor ratifies, namely that the 
Other is, from the outset, originally, hollowed out. 
This impossibility of defining a space of discursivity as a closed system, this 
failure of the Other to ensure a stable foundation for the establishment of the 
social order has ruinous repercussions in both registers, metaphor and metony-
my. However, only metaphor, by providing a new master signifier, is capable of 
rendering a given situation legible, an operation which involves the forcing, the 
crossing of the bar that separates two incommensurable orders: the symbolic 
order and the order of the real, whereas metonymy literally lives for the preser-
vation of this bar, which provokes, on the side of metonymy, an infinite quest for 
the constitutively lacking complement. In order to emphasize the importance 
of this point, Lacan makes a rather disconcerting assertion: metonymy, in his 
view, testifies to “a flight in the face of the anxiety of origins”3 exactly at the 
point, Lacan continues, where “logical rigor” is required. 
3 J. Lacan, “In Memory of Ernest Jones: On His theory of Symbolism”, in Écrits, p. 591.
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This brings us to one of the most important and the most laden with conse-
quences for elaborating emancipatory politics at the present time: the current 
privileging of metonymy over metaphor. The seemingly ostentatious connection 
between politics and rhetoric may find confirmation in the involuted relation-
ship between metaphor and metonymy in the present context of globalization: 
in the present context of the globalized metonymization, the symptom can no 
more “take on its revolutionary effect”4 as it has lost its status of a metaphor.
Expanding on a point which has also been made by Ernesto Laclau, we could take 
a step further and argue that what prevails in the era of a “general rhetorization”5 
is a regime of mastery that relegates the metaphoric closure to a relatively sub-
ordinate role. In effect, not only is even a provisory stabilization brought about 
through the metaphorical totalization, radically called into question, worse, it 
exists only for the sake of generating a whole process of metonymization, which 
seems to have the effect of generating the perpetuation of the new variant of the 
master’s discourse, without allowing a truly novel order to come into being. 
Our point is namely that the modifications of the discourse of the master, the 
total hegemony of a discourse that is structurally metonymic, has decisive con-
sequences for the transformative power of the politics of rhetoric, ultimately, for 
its capacity to change the present transcendental regime of discursivity. In fact, 
once the dominant discourse itself appears to be structured as an endless series 
of metonymic displacements, there seems to be no room left for the rhetorical 
subversion which consists chiefly in showing how the hegemonic, i.e. the meta-
phorical suture of a given social space, is already contaminated by metonymic 
displacements. 
No effective subversion of the dominant discourse can be achieved by means 
of metonymy as this discourse itself, far from being threatened by its incom-
pleteness, literally lives off its own impossible closure. Hence, in the era of the 
generalized rhetoric, i.e., in the era in which metonymy prevails, rhetoric seems 
to be oddly incapable of effecting a cut in the dominant discourse and thereby 
of undermining the state of affairs resulting from it. On the contrary, it seems to 
be rather a continuation of this discourse. As a result, rhetoric finds itself singu-
4 J. Lacan, “Comptes-rendus d’enseignement”, Ornicar ?, n° 29, 1984, p. 24.
5 E. Laclau, “The Politics of Rhetoric”, in B. Cohen, J. H. Miller and A. Warminski (eds) Material 
Events, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2000, p. 247.
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larly disarmed when it comes to tackling the chances of an oppositional politics 
in its contemporary conjecture, i.e. in a discursive universe in which metonymy 
as the organizational principle prevails.
Raising this objection implies an associated concern about the possibility of 
changing a discursive universe in which metonymy appears to be the structuring 
principle, as the constantly renewed attempts to move away from the here and 
now appear to be always reincluded within the dominant discourse and serve 
to continuously uphold it. Hence, contemporary oppositional political must 
pursue a different path if it is to enable us to face the present deadlock where 
nothing appears to stop the expansion of metonymy. This is why the question 
of an emancipatory politics that could bring about change capable of breaking 
decisively with the present impasse of metonymization looms higher than ever 
in the history of politics.
We can find an understanding of the specifically political consequences of this 
impasse in Lacan’s discussion of the relationship between politics and the un-
conscious. 
“The Unconscious is Politics”
“I do not say ‘politics is the unconscious’ but simply ‘the unconscious is 
politics’”6. What is so striking about Lacan’s concessive formulation that will 
guide us is that, under the guise of continuity, an unexpected inversion is pro-
duced, as politics seems to be occupying, contaminating even, the unconscious 
itself, the sole domain which is within the competence of psychoanalysis. With 
this intrusion of politics into the unconscious, the very subject-matter of psy-
choanalysis, something is surreptitiously added that suspends, ruins even, the 
classic Freudian thesis: “politics is the unconscious”7. What this thesis accord-
ing to which the unconscious dominates politics immediately implies is that 
the social bond at stake in politics is governed by a certain logic that operates 
unbeknown to men thus brought together, a logic that “is already operative in 
6 J. Lacan, unpublished seminar “La logique du fantasme” (1966–67), the lesson of 10 May 
1967.




the unconscious”,8 namely the logic of the signifier. Only in this sense can La-
can himself maintain that the discourse of the master, this being his name for 
politics, is the discourse of the unconscious. From such a perspective, it may 
well appear that the formula: “politics is the unconscious”, merely sums up the 
two preceding, now classic, definitions of the unconscious furnished by Lacan 
himself: “The unconscious is structured like a language” and “The unconscious 
is the discourse of the Other”. Yet such a view is rendered extremely problematic 
from the moment that it appears that the Other itself is challenged, or does not 
exist at all. 
For the claim now seems to be more radical, requiring not just that collective for-
mations in the field of politics be analyzed as unconscious formations,9 that is, 
as resulting from the tropological shifts, but that the unconscious itself must be 
accounted for as being linked to, indeed, dependent upon, the discourse of the 
master. Thus, when Lacan in his seminar on The Other Side of Psychoanalysis 
stresses that “[A]s stupid as this discourse of the unconscious is, it is respond-
ing to something that stems from the institution of the discourse of the master 
himself,”10 he thereby implies that any modification of the master’s discourse 
will have decisive consequences for the discourse of the unconscious. To begin 
with, in fact, it is worth noting that when Lacan claims that “the unconscious 
is politics”, he is not only taking into account that “something changed in the 
master’s discourse”11, announcing in that way a suspension, at least in part, of 
the validity of Freud’s formula, thereby confining it to the era in which the Other 
still existed. By stating that “the unconscious is politics”, Lacan can be seen 
to be already suggesting here that in a world in which the Other has become 
problematic, even nonexistent a new and more radical conception of the un-
conscious is required. Clearly, it is not the same to designate the unconscious as 
the discourse of the Other when the latter still existed, or when the existence of 
the Other is quite obviously, that is to say, at the level of hegemonic discourse, 
called into question.
8 J. Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Uncon-
scious,” in Écrits, p. 673.
9 Freud was indeed the first to show, in his famous Group Psychology and the Analysis of the 
Ego, that for there to be a group, it is necessary that its members are hooked up to the same 
identificatory signifier. 
10 J. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, Book XVII, trans. 
by Russel Grigg, W.W. Norton, New York, London 2007, p. 91.
11 Ibid., p. 207.
97
politics and psychoanalysis in the times of the generalized metonymization
This shift in Lacan’s theory of the unconscious could thus be seen as a direct 
effect of the precariousness, in the field of politics, of the very link, the agency 
of the Other, on which the structural equivalence between the discourse of the 
unconscious and the master’s discourse was founded. Taken further, it is clear 
that this move from the first to the second formula has direct implications for La-
can’s theory of the subject. In the first formula, the emphasis is on the alienated 
subject, the subject called into being by the Other, ultimately, the subject as an 
effect of the signifier. The first formula thus makes it possible to account for the 
fact that the subject is produced by discourse, that is, determined through the 
“action of the structure”, yet manages to retain some capacity for action which 
will change the structure of which it is but an effect. The second formula, by con-
trast, is articulated to the barren Other. Consequently, if politics was at the out-
set viewed by Lacan as the paradigm of the master’s discourse, the emergence of 
a new discourse, the capitalist discourse, problematizes the notion of the Other 
as a guarantor, thus shaking up the basic laws of the constitution of the social 
order and changing what constitutes social reality for us.
Hence, if the focal point of this essay is this replacement of the initial Freudian 
thesis: “politics is the unconscious”, by Lacan’s new one: “the unconscious is 
politics”, this is because this substitution announces a switch of paradigms, a 
transition from one discursive regime to another: from a regime in which the 
political field is structured by the reference to the Other which operates through 
identification, prohibition, repression, the matrix of this regime being, of course, 
the master’s discourse, to a regime in which politics as a field is articulated to 
the barred, inexistent Other and where the incompleteness of the space of dis-
cursivity appears to be irrevocable and irreparable. 
Retroactively, the statement “Politics is the unconscious”, can then be viewed 
as a formalization of the equivalence between the master’s discourse and the 
discourse of the unconscious, as indeed they are both conceived as the dis-
course of the Other, more exactly, like a language which is organized by the 
instance of the Other. The second formula amounts to the reversal of the first: 
if the first formula, insofar as it is centred around the famous point de capiton, 
provides us with a formula of metaphorization, the second formula is one of the 
generalization of metonymy, or, rather, of the general metonymyzation. Taking 
into account the mutation of the discourse of the master resulting from the total 
hegemony of the capitalist discourse and thus opening a perspective lacking a 
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quilting point, the second formula can therefore be viewed as a formula forged 
by Lacan for the era of the nonexistent Other, that of the not-all, an era of a dis-
course without conclusion.
The difference between the first and the second formula, can therefore be ex-
emplified in a shift that has been taking place in contemporary theorizing of 
politics over the past few decades – namely, a drift away from a perspective 
in which the realms of rhetoric and politics are viewed as antinomian towards 
an understanding of politics in terms of an open-ended, undecidable space of 
discursivity which requires tropological displacements for its very constitution. 
Now this concerns our problem directly: to evaluate the contemporary possibil-
ity of change in the present conjecture while taking into account the mutation 
of the master’s discourse, that namely which is articulated to the lack in the 
Other, to the barred Other, and which Lacan, as is well known, designated as 
the discourse of the capitalist.
One of the great merits of Lacan’s approach such as it is announced by the state-
ment “the unconscious is politics” lies not only in his highlighting the dead-
locks that the emancipatory politics faces in a universe of the inexistent Other. 
Our claim is namely that in opening the perspective of the not-all, Lacan indi-
cates at the same time the possibility of a fundamentally different politics, one 
which is not restricted to the resistance to and/or the subversion of the master’s 
closure by uncovering its radical contingency.
What follows is an attempt to outline the space of the problem of the not-all and 
to show if and to what extent politics and psychoanalysis are able to face and to 
resist the deadlicks inherent to the generalized metonymization while theoriz-
ing and practicing new forms of the non-segregationist collectivity. Our aim in 
this essay is to contribute towards an understanding of this complex issue, and 
in particular to look at the political and theoretical difficulties associated with 
the construction of the universal in an infinite universe, a universe without a 
beyond.
From the not-all to the “for all”
We set out from the assumption that, for psychoanalysis and for politics of 
emancipation, there must be another perspective, another angle under which it 
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is possible to conceive of a way out while breaking with the prevailing concep-
tion of a solution in terms of a subversion of the existing hegemonic arrange-
ment. 
In what follows we propose to explore the status of the “for all” in politics and 
psychoanalysis by analyzing and bringing into question the seemingly self-evi-
dent relationship of the mutual exclusion between politics and psychoanalysis. 
In order to expose an affinity in dealing with the not-all in politcs and psychoa-
nalysis, it is necessary to move beyond the traditionally hostile polarities of the 
singular and the universal and to reverse the usual perspective, according to 
which there is no passage between the domain of the singular and the domain 
of the universal. We will then move on to consider the relationship between psy-
choanalysis and politics from the point of view of the collectivity “for all” con-
stituted through a complex practice of disidentification and production of the 
generic or, to use Agamben’s term, “whatever” singularities. 
Our starting assumption is that politics and psychoanalysis encounter the same 
structural impasse that of dealing with an irreducible heterogeneity. Indeed, 
the central issue in analysis is precisely that of a knot which “holds the subject 
together”, an instance that links together three registers that would otherwise 
remain disconnected: the symbolic of his or her representation, the real of his 
or her enjoyment, and the imaginary consistency of the body’s image. What the 
analysand learns at the end of his or her analysis is that nothing holds together 
these three instances, the real, the imaginary and the symbolic – except the 
symptom or sinhom as Lacan termed it in his later teaching. 
Politics, likewise, irrespective of the type of government, confronts the impossi-
ble-real under the guise of a similar impasse: how to hold together singularities 
which have nothing in common. Modern politics, at least from the French Revo-
lution onwards, has treated this impossibility of the social bond by constructing 
a form of collectivity which would be “for all”. It is a paradoxical collectivity 
since the condition for its very constitution requires the exclusion of the excep-
tion, of some otherness that is presumed to be evading the universalisation.
One could then say, what is really at stake between psychoanalysis and politics 
is the issue of heterogeneity. Politics and psychonalysis thus appear to be two 
different languages for articulating heterogeneity that are in confrontation with 
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each other. But is the heterogeneity in psychoanalysis the same as that which 
we encounter in politics? What is at issue here is precisely the question: under 
what conditions is it legitimate to bring together politics and psychoanalysis?
Indeed, any attempt to relate psychoanalysis to politics is far from obvious. Ac-
cording to the received idea, there seems to be no common ground permitting 
their encounter. In this view, psychoanalysis is presumed to be defending the 
rights of the singular, of that precisely which resists the universal. Indeed, psy-
choanalysis is by definition the domain of the “not for all”. As such, psychoanal-
ysis cannot, without losing its competence, force the boundaries of confidenti-
ality imposed by its practice to wander into a domain in which, on the contrary, 
something is valid only insofar as it applies to all. From this view, psychoanaly-
sis has no competence in the domain destined “for all”. Politics, by contrast, 
designed as the order of the collective, deals with the masses, with the multiple. 
In so far as politics is preoccupied with the question of that which is valid for all, 
in can only turn a blind eye to the singular: the proper object of psychoanalysis. 
For politics, in which there seems to be no place for the singular, it would be an 
illigitimate step to make the opposite move: from the “for all” to that of the “only 
for one”. Indeed, if we follow the received idea, what makes their encounter im-
possible, is a double interdiction of the passage from the register of the singular 
to that of the multiple. 
We propose to reverse this perspective and to examine under what circumstanc-
es the relation between these two domains, that of the “for all” and that of the 
“irreducible singularity”, can be established. So the very fact of posing the ques-
tion of heterogenity in politics and psychoanalysis, requires the construction of 
a site, a scene for their encounter. 
Our guide in this pivoting of perspective, will be Lacan. We will refer, more spe-
cifically, to his Television, in which he presents both his critique of politics as a 
way out of capitalism and the task of psychoanalysis in a universe governed by 
the capitalist discourse: “The more saints, the more laughter; that’s my prin-
ciple, to wit, the way out of capitalist discourse – which would not constitute 
progress, if it happens only for some.”12 
12 J. Lacan, Television, trans. J. Mehlman, W.W. Nortin & Co., New York 1990, p. 16.
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However, it is important to consider how psychoanalysis can emerge as a way 
out of the capitalist discourse. It is true that Lacan harboured some ambitions 
concerning the role of psychoanalysis in our world, as he puts it. First of all it 
should be noted that to propose psychoanalysis as a solution, as the way out of 
capitalism, is only possible in the very specific circumstance of the collapse of 
the belief in the emancipatory power of politics. In this rather enigmatic remark 
Lacan namely pinpoints one of the greatest problems we face today: the growing 
impasses of the way out of capitalism, i.e. of a master’s discours that yields to 
the generalized metonymization. At the same time psychoanalisis, according to 
Lacan, faces a paradoxical task: to find a way out of a discourse which is con-
sidered to be limitless, “eternal”, a discourse which precisely knows of no way 
out. It could, then, be said that what Lacan proposes as a solution is animated 
by the “passion of and for the real”: to invent, to force even, in the situation of 
an impasse, a radically new solution, that of an immanent transcendence. 
It seems that psychoanalysis, according to Lacan, is capable of succeeding there 
where the politics of emancipation failed: to find a way out of the growing im-
passes of capitalism. Indeed, one is tempted to say that psychoanalysis emerges 
as a tenant-lieu, place-holder of the impossible, absent emancipatory politics. 
Or to be even more precise: psychoanalysis is a new name for the politics of 
emancipation – with all the consequences which follow from this substitution.
Politics of symptom or politics of love?
What then is the politics of psychoanalysis? Indeed, what politics might result 
from psychoanalysis? Actually, there exist two interpretations of the politics of 
psychoanalysis respectively termed the “politics of symptom” and the “politics 
of love”. Both of these interpretations which have their partisans and critiques 
are to a certain extent grounded in Lacan’s work in particular as they both take 
as their point of departure the irreducible heterogeneity inherent in the subject 
as a kernel of the real resisting the dominant social bond. There is something in 
the subject which makes him/her other, unlike any other in the community to 
which he or she belongs. While both of these paradigms refuse the antinomic 
relation between politics and psychoanalysis, they nevertheless differ in outlin-
ing the crucial stake of such a politics proper to psychoanalysis.
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According to first reading, the politics of psychoanalysis is a “politics of symp-
tom”. The task of psychonalysis is to examine contemporary modes of the social 
bond in relation to the symptom. The symptom here is conceived as a specific 
fixing of jouissance proper to each subject. The symptom is that which in the 
subject resists universalisation. The central stake in this politics of symptom 
is to uncover the tension between the social bond and the symptom. More par-
ticularly, to reveal the incompatibility between the allowed and the forbidden 
jouissance. Thus, there is, on one hand, jouissance, such as is prescribed by the 
social Other, and, on the other hand, there is the symptom as a mode of enjoy-
ment, particular to each subject and which is as such irreducible to the standard 
jouissance. Thus, the jouissance under the guise of the symptom is a jouissance 
which presents a threat to the social bond. 
There are two structural consequences that follow from this politics of symp-
tom. The first is that the conclusion to be drawn from the conflict of these two 
jouissances is that nothing can “hold together” subjects-symptoms, nothing 
can bring together these irreducible modes of jouissance. From this perspective 
then, jouissance can be seen as the impossible-real of the social bond. Jouis-
sance, as a symptom, is that irreducible otherness on which no collective logics 
can be grounded. The final lesson to be drawn from psychoanalysis insofar as 
it ventures into the domain of the social and politics is then what we would 
propose to call the “solipsisim of enjoyment”. In other words, politics and psy-
choanalysis are in an antinomic relation.
There is however a problem that this “politics of symptom” cannot solve. Capi-
talism as the hegemonic social bond brings into question what is supposed to 
be the central issue of this politics: the tension between the prescribed, stand-
ard jouissance, and jouissance provided by the symptom. Thus the politics of 
symptom may well have been applicable in Freud’s times. Today, however, there 
seems to be no place for such a politics of symptom precisely to the extent that 
the capitalist discourse itself dissolves the tension between the singular and the 
universal. Capitalism is namely that exceptional social bond, indeed, in a sense 
it could be considered to be an aberration among social bonds, since it realises 
what in all the other bonds seems to be impossible: its compatibility with en-
joyment. Capitalism is namely a social bond which does not demand that the 
subject sacrifice his/her enjoyment. On the contrary, the capitalist social bond 
is a bond that adapts itself to the “trifle”, the private enjoyment of everybody. It 
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is offered as an apparatus which, thanks to the scientific development and the 
market, is able to provide the subject with the lacking enjoyment.
So, from this perspective, not only does enjoyment not endager the capitalist 
social bond, but, on the contrary, capitalism is a discourse in which the “de-
mocracy of enjoyment” rules. This is because, in the capitalist discourse, the 
subject appears to be dis-identified and, consequently, needs to attach oneself 
to anything that could provide one an identity. The second consequence is that 
the subject of the unconscious is completed by products thrown on the market. 
This is why Lacan inamed the subject of the capitalist discourse, “the proletar-
ian”, this being a name for the subject which is inseparable from his or her plus-
de-jouir, object a. We are dealing here with an obscure subjectivation which de-
pends on the conversion of the surplus-value, that is to say any product thrown 
on the market, into the surplus-jouissance, the cause of the subject’s desire. We 
would suggest that it is precisely this indistinction between the surplus-value 
and the surplus-jouissance which makes it possible for the capitalist produc-
tion of “whatever objects” to capture, indeed to enchain the subject’s desire (its 
eternal “this is not it!”). From this perspective, it could be said that capitalism, 
insofar as it promotes the solipsism of enjoyment, promotes at the same time 
a particular communal figure, that which J.-C. Millner termed a “paradoxical 
class”, a community in which its members are joined or held together by that 
which disjoins them, namely enjoyment.
The second paradigm of the politics of psychoanalysis is to a certain extent the 
reversal of the first one. What is at issue here is to show that enjoyment, pre-
cisely as an irreducible heterogeneity, is the point at which psychoanalysis en-
counters politics. Far from precluding all social bond, enjoyment appears rather 
as a foundation for that politics which could be termed, for lack of a better term, 
the “politics of love”. At issue in this paradigm is love for one’s neighbour rather 
than the solipsism of enjoyment.
The texts of reference here are, of course, Civilisation and its Discontents and The 
Ethics of Psychoanalysis, two texts having as their point of departure the presup-
position that what makes the otherness of the other is enjoyment insofar as it is 
evil. For Freud, the evil jouissance I suspect in the Other justifies my reservations 
with regard to him, the reason why the Other does not deserve my love since I 
can give my love only to the one who is like me. For Lacan, on the contrary, it is 
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precisely this evil jouissance that the Other and I have in common. This irreduc-
ible otherness of jouissance is what joins us together. And this is why Lacan can 
claim that “that fundamental evil which dwells within this neighbour […] it also 
dwells in me.”13 This is why Lacan in his “Kant with Sade” reproaches Sade, but 
in an indirect way Freud too, with the misrecognition of his own enjoyment. 
Sade, just like Freud, Lacan says “refuses to be my neighbour”. 
The reason for this refusal, according to Lacan, is that “Sade does not have 
neighborly enough relations with his own malice [méchanceté] to encounter his 
neighbour in it”,14 backing away, just like Freud, from the Christian command-
ment: “Thou shalt love thy neighbour like thyself”. Nothing then, to follow Lacan, 
is closer to me than that which I try desperately to avoid, this nameless, evil en-
joyment that I encounter not only in the Other but in me too. On the other hand, 
it is precisely because, like myself, the Other is in the same position in relation 
to that what Lacan calls la chose la plus proche, that thing which is closest to me 
being of course jouissance, that I can love the Other. What is difficult to swallow 
here is not the idea that the Other is unfathomable, enigmatic, wholly other. 
What is unthinkable is this sameness at the level of enjoyment. That which radi-
cally separates me from the Other, his or her absolutely particular enjoyment, 
is at the same time that which we have in common: this immanent otherness. 
Paradoxically, enjoyment as this extimate otherness is the foundation of same-
ness. 
The crucial point of Lacan’s interpretation of the love of one’s neighbour, far 
from a postmodernist exaltation of the irreducible otherness of the Other, is 
designated here as a strategy for handling this irreducible immancut otherness. 
Love, insofar as it is beyond all transaction, this non-reciprocal love, in the fi-
nal analysis, as a renouncement of any direct equivalent to be given in return, 
all promise of payment, this wholly unmotivated, gratuituous love, love as a 
gift without recompension, is what Lacan proposes as a solution to the impasse 
caused by the encounter with the enjoyment in the Other, with the otherness of 
the Other. This “real” love – real in the sense that it demands the impossible – to 
love somebody for that which turns hatred and aggression against me – is a pos-
sible strategy for handling that otherness in me, for neutralising it. 
13 J. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, trans. D. Porter, Tavis-
tock/Routledge, London 1992, p. 186. 
14 J. Lacan, “Kant avec Sade”, Ecrits, p. 666.
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It is precisely at this point that the political implications of love of thy neigh-
bour can be drawn out. Love of thy neighbour as a way of dealing with enjoy-
ment is precisely what Derrida perceives as a chance for democracy. According 
to Derrida, “there is no democracy without respect for irreducible singularity 
or alterity.” But, Derrida adds, “there is no democracy without a ‘community of 
friends’, without the calculation of majorities, without identifiable, stabilizable, 
representable subjects, all equal”.15 
In this second interpretation of the politics of psychoanalysis, only psychoa-
nalysis, by bringing to light enjoyment as the irreducible singularity common to 
me and my neighbour, as this sameness in otherness, can elaborate a theory of 
the subject appropriate to democracy. Indeed, a theory of subject that is neces-
sary to democracy. 
A nonreciprocal love for thy neighbour severed from all utility, is the point at 
which politics and psychoanalysis necessarily meet. Indeed, such a love can be 
seen as a model for a nonsegregationist community. This is because the indiffer-
ence to the useful which situates love beyond all altruist utilitarianism, signifies 
a radical mutation in the field of politics, a mutation which concerns precisely 
the status of the Other. For the break with the useful characterises not only love 
and friendship, but also hatred, as Freud himself points out in his Civilisation, 
because my enemy is not interested in the profit he might gain from the wrong-
doing he inflicts on me. This leads to a somewhat unexpected conclusion: if the 
refusal of the utility, the indifference as to the possible gain is what friend and 
enemy have in common then the distinction between the friend and the enemy 
disappears.
The crucial question here is of course: what consequences can be drawn from 
the disappearance of the demarcation line between friend and foe, in the final 
analysis, from the collapse of the figure of the Other for the social bond and, 
consequently, for politics? This is precisely the central issue in Schmitt’s theory 
of politics. As is well known, Schmitt situated the friend/enemy discrimination 
at the core of politics. In Schmitt’s view, a mere agglomeration of fellow men 
can never bring about the desired homogeneity of the community. At this level, 
not only is the other not an other at all, but this specular relation is governed 
15 J. Derrida, Politics of Friendship, trans. G. Collins, Verso, London, New York 1997, p. 22.
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by a lethal alternation: if it is you, I am not, and if it is me, it is you who are not. 
Schmitt’s greatest merit is to have pointed out the intrinsic complicity between 
enmity and the Other. If we are to follow Schmitt, for homogeneity to be estab-
lished at all the existence of an instance of dissimilarity, an element of other-
ness is required, that which at the level of the relationship between semblables, 
fellow men, is precisely lacking. Schmitt’s introduction of the friend/enemy dis-
tinction can thus be understood as an attempt at diffusing the hatred that the 
fellow men would otherwise vent against one another through the “exportation” 
of this inherent aggressivity elsewhere. From this perspective, the role of the 
Other is ultimatelly pacifying.
On the other hand, however, hatred is never completely domesticated. As Sch-
mitt himself is forced to acknowledge, the establishment of such a constitutive 
Beyond is always incomplete since the Other is always contaminated by antoth-
er figure of the enemy, the enemy within the community. This other Other, by 
being unlocatable, indiscernible, corrodes the communal being, threatens the 
community with its dissolution. From the very start, there are then two figures 
of the enemy and not simply one: the symbolic enemy that Schmitt calls the po-
litical enemy. And there is yet another figure of the Other: the “real” or internal 
enemy. Whereas the first figure is essentially pacifying, the second activates the 
absolute destructive hostility leading to a permanent civil war. 
In the present constellation of globalisation, we are facing a situation in which, 
strictly speaking, there is no instance that could play the role of the “constitutive 
outside”, no instance of the “they” that would render possible the construction 
of the “we”, since both “we” and “they” are always already “in”, included. It is 
essential to realise how contemporary otherlessness, paradoxically, opens up 
the possibility for the emergence of a hatred that nothing can appease. The pro-
liferation of the hated real others in an era of the nonexistence of the Other is 
necessary since – once the figure of the external, political, “symbolic” enemy is 
eliminated, once everybody is included – anybody, myself included, can occupy 
the place of the radical, real other. For what characterises present-day globalisa-
tion is namely the denial of all exclusion. 
The exclusion of the exclusion did not, however, make the exclusion disappear, 
it has only become internal and thus invisible. It is precisely because the frontier 
between the included and the excluded is ultimately invisible, as there is no 
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sign, no attribute that would help me determine who is “in” and who is “out”, 
that, in a universe without beyond or limit, a universe that knows of no excep-
tion, anybody can, in principle, find himself/herself occupying the place of the 
real, dehumanised Other. 
This is precisely the reason that the “politics of love”, a politics which aims at 
the impossible articulation of the otherness and the social bond, the impossibil-
ity of counting and the necessity of counting, remains forever contained within 
the perspective of the promise, it is forever “to come”, à venir, never in the here 
and now. In other words, such a politics cannot provide us with a satisfactory 
answer to the question: how is it possible to justify the legitimacy of the move 
from the singular to the universal. The politics of love is satisfied with the ceas-
less affirmation of the singularity of otherness. That is why it cannot indicate a 
way in which this singularity could be asserted politically, in which way to po-
liticise the singularity of the singular by introducing another principle of count-
ing: that of counting the uncounted, the uncountable. Ultimately, what such a 
conception of politics in terms of love misrecognises is precisely the irreducible 
gap between counting and the impossibility of counting as the sole site in which 
the politics of emancipation can be situated. We propose to call the politics of 
emancipation that politics that organises a confrontation between counting and 
the impossibility of counting, an operation that reveals the constitutive impos-
sibility of institutionalising a collectivity “for all”, a collectivity in which what is 
at stake is precisely the predicate determining the belonging to the community, 
the demarcating line between inside/outside, us/them. 
It is precisely at this point that the politics of emancipation encounters psychoa-
nalysis. We would argue that psychoanalysis can show us how it is possible, 
in spite everything, to think and to practice a collectivity “for all” as an open, 
nonsegregationist collectivity. For the great merit of Lacan’s proposed solution 
in Television consists in recasting the question of the universal, of the “for all”, 
from the perspective of the infinite. Clearly, the solution proposed by Lacan is 
a paradoxical solution since we are dealing here with an “interior way out”, if I 
may say so, a paradoxical way out which implies no transgression, no forcing of 
a barrier, since there is no barrier separating the outside and the inside. In view 
of this interiour way out, everything depends, of course, on the way in which we 
understand Lacan’s statement: “It would not constitute progress if it happens 
only to some”. Does the expression “not only for some” imply “for all” or not? 
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Our claim is that it points in the direction of the “for all”. To be sure, this is a very 
peculiar “for all” since, in the not-all, that is, in an infinite universe in which this 
“for all” is situated, it is impossible to state the universality of the predicate. 
To fully grasp the political implications of this articulation of the “for all” to 
the “not-all”, we must distinguish between two forms of the not-all: the not-all 
of incompleteness and the not-all of inconsistence. The first not-all is what we 
usually refer to as the all or the universal, to use its traditional name. This cat-
egory designates a unity constructed through the limitation, put more precisely, 
through the exclusion of an exception. And there is another form of the not-all, 
the inconsistent not-all which can, paradoxically, be obtained, not through the 
exclusion of the exception, but through its inclusion. By the very fact of sub-
tracting the exception from a series we render it limitless, non-totalizable.
Now, what exactly is the status of the exception in the not-all? We cannot simply 
state: there is no exception to the universal function, for instance, “All As are 
B”. We should rather say: if there is an exception we don’t know where to find 
it. From the perspective of the not-all, the exception is seen as being erratic, it is 
everywhere, yet nowhere to be found. It could then be said that the exception is 
generalised. We could also say, for instance, that we are all exceptions. 
It then follows that the first figure of the not-all is subtractive or segregationist, 
because the price to be paid for the constitution of the “all” is the exclusion of 
those who do not posses the required predicate. A “true” not-all is non-segrega-
tionist because, from the outset, all exception is undecidable, indeterminable. 
Consequently, such a not-all is open, inclusive, in a word: “for all”. We can see 
here a solution to the impasse that Schmitt confronted: how to conceive of a 
community when there is no Other from which the members of the community 
are to be distinguished. It could then be said the politics of the non-segregation-
ist not-all is symetrically inversed compared to that proposed by Schmitt as it 
consists in including the Other rather than in excluding the Other. Not of course 
in the name of respecting the rights of otherness, openness to the Other, but in 
order to bring into question the communal identity, the supposed homogeneity 
of the group.
It is this second aspect of the not-all, one in which it is impossible to determine 
the existence of a totalizing exception that can best be illustrated by the politics 
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inherent to Lacan’s School: École de la cause. For there is yet another way of 
dealing with the problem of the structural non-totalization. 
A shift in Lacan’s reflections on politics in general and the functioning of a psy-
choanalytical institution whose principal task would be the transmission of a 
radical singular experience such as can only be encountered in an analysis, is 
marked by a paradoxical thesis according to which: a group is the real, that is, 
according to his vocabulary, a radical impossibility. Yet the real of the group 
is that which is precisely at stake in the foundation of his School: École de la 
Cause, School of the Cause. If we propose to consider Lacan’s thesis about the 
real of the group seriously, this is precisely because Lacan, while insisting on 
the impossibility of the group, by founding his School nevertheless succeeded 
in demonstrating that there is a way of dealing with this impossibility.
Lacan’s solution to the impasse of collectivity consists in opening his School “to 
everybody”, which is to say “to anybody”. If there is absolutely nothing to define 
the analyst, no pregiven predicate or property on which his identification could 
be grounded, then the only solution is to call on all who are willing to work in 
the Freudian field. By inviting to his school anybody, without any qualification, 
Lacan created an open, empty space destined to be inhabited only by a special 
kind of work, the work of the “determined workers”16, be it analysis or not, as 
he puts it. 
As the expression “determined worker” suggests, it is the work that decides the 
belonging to the collectivity. This also implies that this work cannot be standa-
rised. The work to be done is by definition indeterminable since it cannot take 
place unless there is a transference to the cause. This expression, “determined 
worker”, emphasizes the importance of the fidelity to a cause, the willingness 
of everyone involved in it to risk himself or herself and his or her desire in the 
pursuit of what is ultimately unknowable. All that the work to be done by every-
body requires, and that despite the fact that neither its quality nor quantitiy can 
be prescribed, is a new relation to the cause; in the final analysis: the task that 
everybody is confronted with is that of inventing psychoanalysis. 
16 This expression was introduced by Lacan in his “Fouding Act”, in Jacques Lacan, Television. 
A Callenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment, p. 100.
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It is precisely in this sense that in Lacan’s School it is impossible to distinguish 
good, determined workers from idlers. Rather, School of the Cause is to be seen 
as a collectivity that is profoundly non-segregationist. It is non-segregationist 
because the presence of an element allegedly heterogeneous to the collectivity, 
a non-analyst, is not only tolerated but required in order to bringing into ques-
tion the predicate: to be an analyst.
This collectivity “for all” thus serves us as a model for the anonymous egali-
tarianism in so far as it renders visible the functioning of both universalist, al-
though incompatible logics: the one that is grounded in the exception, and the 
other that takes as its departure point the axiom according to which: “there is 
none who has not got it”, namely the capacity to be a determined worker. 
The paradox of the politics implied in Lacan’s School resides namely in the fact 
that it is situated precisely at the level of that which cannot be represented nor 
counted as it is what is left after the operation of disidentification. In short, it 
is situated at the level of the pure, whatever singularity. Yet it is precisely this 
irreducible singularity that Lacan’s School proposes to take into account, to 
‘count’. For the ambition of Lacan’s School is not only to find a way out of the 
traps of identification. It is above all to find, to force, a passage there where there 
is a non-passage, an impasse, a deadlock, of the group. What is at stake in the 
foundation of the École de la Cause is a paradoxical project: to universalise the 
singular. 
We can see now that what is at stake in the distinction of the two logics of the 
universal is eminently political. At issue here is the way in which the logics of 
the not-all is set to work, made operational there where the segregationist logics 
operate, there where the exclusion, be it visible or invisible, reigns.
From this perspective, Lacan’s School can be viewed as a special collectivity “for 
all”, that of workers, a collectivity which implies the disidentification practised 
at the level of the group: everyone ought to become anyone, a whatever singu-
larity. This is not to say that one discovers oneself as already being such. On the 
contrary, one only becomes such: anyone. This is a subjective transformation 
that everyone has to accomplish at his/her own risk. This is because the collec-
tivity “for all” is ultimately grounded in a cause that sets us to work. As such, it 
111
politics and psychoanalysis in the times of the generalized metonymization
includes in the real a radical novelty: a paradoxical collectivity that is at once 
not-all, non-totalisable and yet at the same time “for all”, offered to all.
Such a collectivity “for all” that is grounded in the real of the group, which is to 
say in its impossibility, is certainly a forcing: a forcing of saying, because what 
characterises such a collectivity is precisely the advent of an allegedly mute, 
uncounted, invisible instance that starts to speak out and, in so doing, asserts 
its presence: “We are here”. But it is also a forcing of all social order and its 
counting. For what is at issue here is not to correct the miscount made by the 
social order by including those who were left outside, those who did not count, 
but rather to accomplish, in view of those uncounted and counted alike, the 
operation of transfinitisation, an operation that aims at constituting an open, 
non-segregationist for all that is governed by the logic of the “one by one”. How 
many members will count this “for all” of the not-all? It doesn’t matter. It is not 
about the numbers. On the condition, however, that it remains, just like a Canto-
rian aleph, indifferent, impervious, to both all addition and all subtraction. This 
is because this paradoxical interior way out is nothing other than the constitu-
tion of a local, temporary, provisional collectivity “for all”. It is not to remain 
forever. All that remains forever, ultimately, is its name and its call. 
